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 1 Honorable John R. Padova, Senior Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
sitting by designation.  
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Corey Grant was sixteen years old when he committed 
various crimes that led to his ultimate incarceration.  He was 
convicted in 1992 of conspiracy and racketeering under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), as well as of various drug trafficking charges and a 
gun charge.  At sentencing, the District Court determined that 
Grant would never be fit to reenter society and sentenced him 
to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for 
the RICO conspiracy and racketeering convictions.  He 
received a concurrent forty-year term for the drug convictions 
and a mandatory consecutive five-year term for the gun 
conviction.  
 In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 
which held, inter alia, that only incorrigible juvenile homicide 
offenders who have no capacity to reform may be sentenced to 
LWOP.  567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012).  It also extended the 
Court’s earlier holding in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 
(2010)—that juvenile non-homicide offenders are entitled to a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”—to all non-
incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders.  567 U.S. at 479 
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75); see also id. at 473; Graham, 
560 U.S. at 82.  In light of Miller, the District Court granted 
Grant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  At resentencing, the District 
Court determined that Grant’s upbringing, debilitating 
characteristics of youth, and post-conviction record 
demonstrated that he had the capacity to reform and that a 
LWOP sentence was therefore inappropriate under Miller.  
Instead, the District Court sentenced Grant to a term of sixty-
five years without parole.     
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 On appeal, Grant challenges the constitutionality of his 
new sentence.  He contends that he will be released at age 
seventy-two at the earliest, which he purports to be the same 
age as his life expectancy.  In Grant’s estimation, his sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States because it constitutes de facto LWOP and 
therefore fails to account for his capacity for reform and to 
afford him a meaningful opportunity for release. 
 This case presents several difficult challenges for this 
Court.  It calls upon us to decide a novel issue of constitutional 
law: whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a term-of-years 
sentence for the duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life 
expectancy (i.e., “de facto LWOP”) when the defendant’s 
“crimes reflect transient immaturity [and not] . . . irreparable 
corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 
(2016).  Next, if we find that it does, then we must decide what 
framework will properly effectuate the Supreme Court’s 
determination that the Eighth Amendment affords non-
incorrigible juvenile offenders a right to a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  Furthermore, we must take great pains 
throughout our discussion to account for the substantive 
distinction that the Supreme Court has made between 
incorrigible and non-incorrigible juvenile offenders in order to 
ensure that the latter is not subjected to “a punishment that the 
law cannot impose upon [them].”  Id. (quoting Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).   
 Our decision today therefore represents an incremental 
step in the constitutional discourse over the unique protections 
that the Eighth Amendment affords to juvenile homicide 
offenders. 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In March 1987, local law enforcement authorities in 
Elizabeth, New Jersey became aware of an organized gang of 
teenagers called the E-Port Posse, led by Bilal Pretlow.  The 
Posse operated a narcotics network that would regularly buy 
multi-kilogram amounts of cocaine in New York City, cut and 
package the cocaine in stash houses, and sell it on the streets of 
Elizabeth.  Its members had access to firearms and they 
regularly used threats, physical violence and murder to carry 
out their objectives.  Appellant Corey Grant—who was thirteen 
when he joined the Posse in 1986—was employed as one of 
the Posse’s main enforcers.       
 On January 25, 1991, a superseding indictment charged 
Grant with RICO conspiracy (Count 1), in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(d); racketeering (Count 2), in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c); conspiracy to possess with the intent to 
distribute cocaine (Count 4), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 
two counts of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine 
(Counts 5 and 6), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and 
two counts of possession of a weapon in relation to a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
(Counts 10 and 11), one of which was dismissed prior to the 
return of a verdict.2     
 Grant, who was below the age of eighteen during his 
tenure with the Posse, proceeded to trial as an adult in February 
1992.  The jury returned a partial verdict finding him guilty of 
                                              
 2 The indictment charged multiple individuals involved 
in the E-Port Posse.  The charges discussed here are limited to 
those made against Grant.   
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the RICO conspiracy, racketeering, and drug and gun 
possession counts (Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 11), and—as 
predicates for the racketeering charge—found that he 
murdered Mario Lee and attempted to murder Dion Lee.     
 Dion Lee was a former member of the E-Port Posse who 
continued to individually sell drugs after leaving the gang.  In 
August 1989, Grant, who was sixteen years old at the time, 
encountered a group of rival drug dealers while delivering 
drugs for Pretlow, including Lee.  Grant warned Lee at 
gunpoint not to be in Pretlow’s territory unless he was working 
for Pretlow.  Lee refused, and Grant struck him in the head with 
a gun while another Posse member assaulted him.  When Lee 
retreated, Grant and an associate shot him in the leg.  Lee 
ultimately survived.      
 Later that month, Grant encountered Dion’s brother, 
Mario Lee, another independent drug dealer who was warned 
by the Posse not to operate within its territory.  Grant 
confronted Lee in an apartment courtyard where drugs were 
commonly sold and tried to force Lee into the building.  Lee 
broke free and began to retreat, but Grant ordered his associate 
to shoot Lee to prevent any escape.  The associate killed Lee.   
 At sentencing, the District Court denied Grant’s 
departure motion and imposed a sentence within the then-
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines of LWOP on the two RICO 
counts, a concurrent forty-year term of imprisonment on the 
drug-trafficking counts, and a five-year consecutive term of 
imprisonment on the gun possession count.  The convictions 
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.  United States v. 
Grant, 6 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1061 (1994).   
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 Twelve years later, Grant sought a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We affirmed.  Grant v. Williamson, 198 F. App’x 
263, 264 (3d Cir. 2006).  Grant then filed a § 2255 motion, 
which was dismissed as untimely.  Grant v. United States, No. 
CIV. A. 06-5952 HAA, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2008). 
 In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller, which held 
that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders violated the Eighth Amendment.  567 U.S. at 479.  
Grant subsequently sought and received leave from this Court 
to file a second § 2255 motion.  In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 
282 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).  He argued that his LWOP 
sentence was imposed without consideration of mitigating 
circumstances related to his age at the time of his crimes.  The 
District Court agreed and ordered that Grant be resentenced.  
Grant v. United States, No. CIV. A. 12-6844 JLL, slip. op. at 
7 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2014).  
 At resentencing, the District Court limited the scope of 
its review to the RICO conspiracy and racketeering counts, the 
charges for which Grant received a mandatory life sentence, 
thereby leaving in place the forty-year sentence for drug crimes 
and the mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for illegal 
gun possession.  It determined that Grant’s upbringing, 
debilitating characteristics of youth, and post-conviction 
record sufficiently evidenced that he was not incorrigible and 
that an LWOP sentence was therefore inappropriate under 
Miller.  However, the District Court also emphasized that it 
would issue a sentence that “promote[s] respect for the law,” 
“provide[s] just punishment,” and “protect[s] the public.”  
App.  154-55.  It then imposed a term of sixty-years’ 
imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently with the 
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drug charges, resulting in a new effective sentence of sixty-five 
years without parole.3   
 Under this sentence, assuming good time credit, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), Grant will be eligible for release at age 
seventy-two, which he contends is the same age as his life 
expectancy.  Grant now appeals his new sentence to this Court. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “We employ a plenary standard of review 
to a defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence.”  
United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). 
  
                                              
 3 The District Court also unwittingly imposed a sixty-
year sentence on Count 4, a drug offense for which Grant was 
originally sentenced to forty years.  The District Court 
decided—just prior to issuing this sentence—that the scope of 
its review was limited to Counts 1 and 2, and that it would leave 
intact the original sentence for Grant’s drug convictions.  App. 
152 (“[T]here is nothing in the record before me that would 
indicate that [there] was some kind of clear manifest injustice 
by [the original District Court] with the sentence that [it] issued 
with regard to the drug conviction . . . .”).  The District Court’s 
sixty-year resentence to Count 4 was therefore undoubtedly 
inadvertent error.  We will vacate that sentence and instruct the 
District Court to reinstate the original forty-year concurrent 
sentence for Count 4. 
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III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
 The Supreme Court has long grappled with the societal 
bounds of imposing the most severe punishments.  It has 
maintained that the scope of what is considered cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment is not fixed, 
but instead depends on “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 
469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).  Of 
equal importance, sentencing must also be individualized to 
account for the defendant’s mitigating circumstances to ensure 
that the most serious punishments are “reserved only for the 
most culpable defendants committing the most serious 
offenses.”  Id. at 476.  The Court therefore has categorically 
prohibited the imposition of the most severe punishments on 
classes of defendants that have diminished culpability due to 
immutable characteristics and where state practice and 
legislative enactments demonstrate a national consensus 
against imposing those punishments on members of that class.  
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding 
that Eighth Amendment proscribes death penalty for 
intellectually disabled offenders).  
 This case requires us to further consider the societal 
boundaries of punishing juvenile homicide offenders.  We 
therefore feel it necessary to inform our forthcoming analysis 
by detailing the line of Supreme Court cases that, under the 
Eighth Amendment, has proscribed the most severe 
punishments from being imposed on juvenile offenders: (1) 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (prohibiting death 
penalty for juvenile offenders); (2) Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 
(prohibiting LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders); (3) 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (prohibiting mandatory LWOP for 
juvenile homicide offenders); and (4) Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 
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at 729, 736 (holding that Miller applies retroactively on 
collateral review).  At bottom, we must consider whether the 
logic of these cases—that the debilitating characteristics of 
youth make juveniles less deserving of the most severe 
punishments—forecloses de facto LWOP for juvenile 
offenders whose crimes do not reflect “irreparable corruption.”  
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 
480-81).  As such, this case requires us to consider the next 
incremental step in the constitutional dialogue over the 
contours of the Eighth Amendment’s protections, as applied to 
juvenile homicide offenders.   
A. Roper v. Simmons 
 In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the death penalty for defendants who 
committed their crimes before the age of eighteen.  543 U.S. at 
578.  After determining that there existed a national consensus 
against the death penalty for juvenile offenders, the Court, 
relying on science and social science, reasoned that, relative to 
adults, juveniles have a “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; that they “are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure”; and that their characters 
and personality traits are “more transitory, less fixed.”  Id. at 
569-70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 589 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); 
accord Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.  The failings of a minor 
therefore are not the moral equivalent of those of an adult 
because there is a greater possibility that a minor’s character 
deficiencies “will be reformed.”  543 U.S. at 570.  
Accordingly, Roper established the principle that juvenile 
offenders are not deserving of the most severe punishments 
because they are innately less culpable than adults.  Id. at 569-
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70 (“[J]uvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders.”).   
 In light of these innate characteristics, the Court also 
determined that the penological justifications for the death 
penalty—i.e., retribution and deterrence—have diminished 
applicability to juvenile offenders.  Retribution, the Court 
noted, “is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is 
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity.”  Id. at 571.  As for deterrence, the Court 
determined that “the same characteristics that render juveniles 
less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”  Id.  Thus, because juveniles are 
less culpable than adults and there is diminished justification 
for imposing severe punishments on juvenile offenders, the 
Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not permit 
juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death.  Id. at 578.  
B. Graham v. Florida  
 Building on the logic of Roper, Graham held that the 
Eighth Amendment bars juvenile offenders from being 
sentenced to LWOP for a non-homicide crime.  560 U.S. at 74-
75, 82.  As with Roper, the Graham Court first determined that 
a national consensus had developed against LWOP for juvenile 
non-homicide offenders.4  Id. at 62-67.  It then reaffirmed 
                                              
 4 The Court reasoned that “only 11 jurisdictions 
nationwide in fact impose life without parole sentences on 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders—and most of those do so 
quite rarely—while 26 States, the District of Columbia, and the 
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Roper’s fundamental principle that juveniles are less culpable 
than adults, id. at 68, and concluded that “compared to an adult 
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill 
has a twice diminished moral culpability.  The age of the 
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis,” 
id. at 69. 
 The Court reasoned that LWOP was an overly severe 
punishment because it uniquely shares particular 
characteristics with capital punishment.  Like the death 
penalty, LWOP “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable” and “deprives the convict of the most basic 
liberties without giving hope of restoration.”  Id. at 69-70; see 
also id. at 69 (“[LWOP] is the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law.” (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1001 (1991))).  Put differently: 
Life in prison without the possibility of parole 
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison 
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, 
no hope.  Maturity can lead to that considered 
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, 
renewal, and rehabilitation.  A young person who 
knows that he or she has no chance to leave 
prison before life’s end has little incentive to 
become a responsible individual. 
                                              
Federal Government do not impose them despite apparent 
statutory authorization.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 64. 
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Id. at 79.  Also, according to the Court, LWOP is an even 
harsher punishment for juveniles than it is for adults because 
“a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a 
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”  
Id.  at 70.  Thus, “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each 
sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment 
in name only.”  Id. at 70.  “This reality,” the Court stated, 
“cannot be ignored.”    
 Next, the Court extended the penological reasoning of 
Roper to LWOP, noting that “none of the goals of penal 
sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—provides an 
adequate justification” and that “[a] sentence lacking any 
legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense.”  Id. at 71.  Regarding 
retribution and deterrence, the Court reiterated its reasoning 
from Roper.  Id. at 71-72.  But unlike in Roper, the Graham 
Court also addressed incapacitation and rehabilitation, 
concluding that neither justified the imposition of LWOP on 
juvenile non-homicide offenders.   
 As to the former, the Court explained: 
To justify life without parole on the assumption 
that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger 
to society requires the sentencer to make a 
judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.  The 
characteristics of juveniles make that judgment 
questionable.  It is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects 
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irreparable corruption. . . . [I]ncorrigibility is 
inconsistent with youth.   
Id. at 72-73 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Regarding rehabilitation, the Court reasoned that LWOP 
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal” because “[b]y 
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the 
State [impermissibly] makes an irrevocable judgment about 
that person’s value and place in society” that fails to account 
for his or her “capacity for change and limited moral 
culpability.”  Id. at 74.    
 Critical to this case, in order to effectuate its holding 
that the Eighth Amendment forbids LWOP sentences for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders, the Court mandated that such 
offenders be afforded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release” during their lifetime:  
A State is not required to guarantee eventual 
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a 
nonhomicide crime.  What the State must do, 
however, is give defendants like Graham some 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based 
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. . . . 
The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the 
possibility that persons convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes committed before 
adulthood will remain behind bars for life.  It 
does prohibit States from making the judgment 
at the outset that those offenders never will be fit 
to reenter society. 
Id. at 75; see also id. at 82 (“A State need not guarantee the 
offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it 
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must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to 
obtain release before the end of that term.”).  It is the scope of 
this mandate, which the Court reiterated in Miller, that we 
consider today.  See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (quoting Graham, 
560 U.S. at 75). 
C. Miller v. Alabama 
 Relying on Graham as its “foundation stone,” Miller 
held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 470 n.4, 479; 
see also id. at 473 (“Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-
without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its 
categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”).  
Mandatory LWOP, the Court reasoned, contradicts Graham’s 
and Roper’s core principle—“that imposition of a State’s most 
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as 
though they were not children”—because it prevents 
sentencing judges from taking into account the juvenile’s 
youth and attendant circumstances.  Id. at 473-74.   
   Furthermore, having found in Graham that juvenile 
life sentences were analogous to capital punishment, the Court 
in Miller concluded that a line of cases that requires 
individualized sentencing when imposing the death penalty 
also applies to mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders.  Id. at 
475-76.  Accordingly, a sentencing court must have the ability 
to consider the “mitigating qualities of youth” because “youth 
is more than a chronological fact.”  Id. at 476 (citations 
omitted).   
 Notably, however, the Court did not categorically ban 
LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders.  Rather, it required 
courts to conduct individualized sentencing hearings that “take 
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into account how children are different, and how these 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a 
lifetime in prison” before imposing LWOP.  Id. at 480.  In 
discussing the deficiencies of a scheme that treats every child 
as an adult, the Court enumerated various considerations that 
doubtlessly can be used to determine whether a juvenile 
offender is incorrigible:       
 “[C]hronological age and its hallmark features—among 
them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate 
risks and consequences.”  Id. at 477. 
 “[T]he family and home environment that surrounds 
[the juvenile offender]—and from which he cannot 
usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional.”  Id. 
 “[T]he circumstances of the homicide offense, 
including the extent of his participation in the conduct 
and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him.”  Id. 
 “[T]hat he might have been charged and convicted of a 
lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with 
youth—for example, his inability to deal with police 
officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) 
or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.”  Id. at 477-
78.  
 “[T]he possibility of rehabilitation . . . .”  Id. at 478. 
 The Court, however, cautioned that the bar for imposing 
LWOP is high.  It predicted that LWOP would “be uncommon” 
and reserved only for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
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reflects irreparable corruption.”  Id. at 479-80 (quoting Roper, 
543 U.S. at 573).  Thus, while not a categorical bar, Miller 
effectively prohibits LWOP for nearly all juvenile offenders.  
Only those who are permanently incorrigible may receive such 
a sentence.  
D. Montgomery v. Louisiana 
 Montgomery held that Miller applied retroactively on 
collateral review because it announced a new substantive rule 
of constitutional law:  
Even if a court considers a child’s age before 
sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that 
sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a 
child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity.  Because Miller determined 
that sentencing a child to life without parole is 
excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption, it 
rendered life without parole an unconstitutional 
penalty for a class of defendants because of their 
status—that is, juvenile offenders whose crimes 
reflect the transient immaturity of youth. As a 
result, Miller announced a substantive rule of 
constitutional law.  Like other substantive rules, 
Miller is retroactive . . . . 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).    
 Montgomery also reiterated that “Miller requires a 
sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics before determining that life without parole is a 
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proportionate sentence” and that “[a] hearing where ‘youth and 
its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing 
factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may be 
sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.”  Id. 
at 734-35.  Thus, after echoing Miller’s admonition that 
imposition of LWOP on a juvenile homicide offender will be 
“rare,” the Court made clear that “Miller drew a line between 
children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those 
rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”  Id. 
at 734.   
 Several state legislatures have reacted to Miller and 
Montgomery by either affording juvenile homicide offenders 
an early opportunity to seek parole, capping the length that a 
juvenile offender may be sentenced for homicide, or both.  See, 
e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(b)(5) (requiring courts to either 
sentence juvenile homicide offenders to 30 years without 
parole or to make them eligible for parole after 30 years).  
Conversely, Congress—which abolished parole in the federal 
system5—has not enacted any legislation to date to effectuate 
the Supreme Court’s holdings.  Our task, therefore, is to 
determine what minimum protections the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires in the absence of 
such congressional action.6  
                                              
 5 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027 (repealing 18 
U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218). 
 6 Our decision today is therefore not the only 
constitutionally permissible remedy to this case, as Congress 
retains the prerogative to afford additional protections to 
juvenile homicide offenders beyond the minimal safeguards 
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IV. DE-FACTO LWOP 
 Grant challenges the constitutionality of his sixty-five 
year sentence, arguing that it violates the Eighth Amendment 
under Miller because he will be released no earlier than at age 
seventy-two.  Citing various life expectancy estimates, Grant 
argues that his life expectancy is also seventy-two, and that he 
is therefore likely to die in prison since decades of 
imprisonment diminish life expectancy.  This case raises an 
issue of first impression for this Court: does the Eighth 
Amendment prohibit term-of-years sentences for the entire 
duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy 
when the defendant’s “crimes reflect transient immaturity [and 
not] . . . irreparable corruption,” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 
734?   
 We hold that it does.7  A term-of-years sentence without 
parole that meets or exceeds the life expectancy of a juvenile 
                                              
that the Eighth Amendment provides.  See Miknevich, 638 F.3d 
at 186 (“[Congress] possesses broad authority to determine the 
types and limits of punishments for crimes.”).   
 7 This holding extends to all sentencings of juvenile 
non-homicide offenders because, by definition, such offenders 
are not incorrigible.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (“[W]hen 
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not 
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability.”).  Since we hold that non-incorrigible juvenile 
homicide offenders cannot be sentenced to de facto LWOP, the 
same must be true for juvenile non-homicide offenders as well. 
See id. (“The Court has recognized that defendants who do not 
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are 
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offender who is still capable of reform is inherently 
disproportionate and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment 
under both Miller and Graham.  We reach this conclusion for 
three reasons.  First, Miller reserves the sentence of LWOP 
only for juvenile homicide offenders “whose crimes reflect 
permanent incorrigibility.”  Id.  Second, the Supreme Court’s 
concerns about the diminished penological justification for 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders apply with equal 
strength to de facto LWOP sentences.  Third, de facto LWOP 
is irreconcilable with Graham and Miller’s mandate that 
sentencing judges must provide non-incorrigible juvenile 
offenders with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  Graham, 
560 U.S. at 75; see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.8   
A. Miller reserved LWOP only for “incorrigible” juvenile 
homicide offenders. 
 To fully appreciate why LWOP sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders who are capable of reform violate the 
Eighth Amendment, we must first consider the genesis of the 
Supreme Court’s distinction between incorrigible and non-
incorrigible juveniles.  Miller, like Graham and Roper, is based 
                                              
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.”). 
 8 Notably, at oral argument, the Government conceded 
that a sentence that exceeds the life expectancy of a non-
incorrigible juvenile homicide offender violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  The Government contends, however, that in this 
case, Grant’s life expectancy is 76.7 and that he is therefore 
likely to be released before his death, consistent with Miller.  
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on the principle that the debilitating characteristics of youth—
namely that children have heightened immaturity, increased 
vulnerability to peer pressure, and more transient identities—
make “children . . . constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing.”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  Miller 
therefore requires sentencing courts to “take into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel 
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”  
Id. at 480.   
 To effectuate this constitutional principle that youth 
mitigates against the imposition of the most severe 
punishments on children, the Court “drew a line” between two 
classes of juvenile homicide offenders.  Montgomery, 136 S. 
Ct. at 734.  The first is non-incorrigible juvenile offenders who 
are capable of reform and “whose crimes reflect transient 
immaturity.”  Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).  The second 
is “rare” incorrigible juvenile offenders who have no capacity 
for change and “whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”  
Id.  (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80).  Only the second class 
of homicide offenders may be sentenced to LWOP.  That this 
distinction is of constitutional magnitude was made 
incontrovertibly clear in Montgomery, where the Court held 
that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law 
because “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient 
immaturity of youth” constitute a class of defendants upon 
which LWOP cannot be imposed.  Id. (“Before Miller, every 
juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could be sentenced to 
life without parole. After Miller, it will be the rare juvenile 
offender who can receive that same sentence.”).  We must 
therefore give effect to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
that children who are found to have the capacity for change are 
to be treated differently than those who are not. 
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 A sentence for a juvenile offender who is not 
incorrigible but that still results in him spending the rest of his 
life in prison does not appreciate the categorical differences 
between children and adults and between children who are 
incorrigible and those that have “diminished culpability and 
greater prospects for reform.”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.  
Moreover, there is no indication that Miller’s holdings 
depended on a sentence formally being designated as LWOP.  
For example, the Court’s categorization of LWOP as a 
particularly harsh sentence for juveniles, and even as one akin 
to the death penalty, see id. at 474, did not turn on the 
sentence’s formal designation.  Both punishments 
“[i]mprison[] an offender until he dies” and “alters the 
remainder of his life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”  Id. at 
474-75.  Indeed, it would make little sense if sentencing courts 
could circumvent Miller and eradicate this constitutionally 
required distinction simply by imposing extraordinarily high 
term-of-years sentences.  Thus, a sentence that treats a non-
incorrigible juvenile offender as if he or she were an 
incorrigible one is irreconcilable with Miller.    
B. The Court’s penological concerns regarding juvenile 
LWOP sentences apply with equal strength to de facto 
LWOP sentences.  
 A de facto LWOP sentence for a non-incorrigible 
juvenile offender also violates the Eighth Amendment because 
it lacks an adequate constitutional justification to make it a 
proportionate sentence.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (“A 
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by 
its nature disproportionate to the offense.”).  “Miller . . . did 
more than require a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s 
youth before imposing life without parole; it established that 
the penological justifications for life without parole collapse in 
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light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” Montgomery, 136 
S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472).  Indeed, all of 
the reasons provided in Graham for why traditional 
penological justifications cannot validate LWOP against non-
homicide offenders, see 560 U.S. at 71-75, apply with equal 
strength to non-incorrigible juvenile homicide offenders: the 
impotence of deterring juveniles, the shortcomings of 
retribution as a result of diminished culpability, the increased 
opportunity for reform that vitiates incapacitation, and the 
irreconcilable tension between LWOP sentences and 
rehabilitation.  These distinctive attributes are equally relevant 
regardless of the crime or of the formal distinction between de 
facto and de jure LWOP sentences:    
[N]one of what it said about children—about 
their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and 
environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-
specific. Those features are evident in the same 
way, and to the same degree, when . . . a botched 
robbery turns into a killing. So Graham’s 
reasoning implicates any life-without-parole 
sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its 
categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide 
offenses. 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473; see also id. at 471 (“Our decisions 
rest[] . . . on common sense—on what ‘any parent knows’ 
. . . .” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569)).9  Thus, without an 
                                              
 9 Incapacitation is the only conceivable penological 
justification that could apply with more force to a non-
incorrigible juvenile homicide offender than to a juvenile non-
homicide offender.  The logic there would be that recidivism 
by the homicide offender poses an enhanced risk to public 
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adequate constitutional justification, de facto LWOP remains a 
disproportionate sentence for a non-incorrigible juvenile 
offender, rendering it unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Id. at 473 (“The characteristics of youth, and the 
way they weaken rationales for punishment, can render a life-
without-parole sentence disproportionate.”); see also id. at 469 
(“[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth 
Amendment.” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 59)). 
C. De facto LWOP violates Graham’s and Miller’s 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release” mandate. 
 For the purposes of considering whether a de facto 
LWOP sentence for a non-incorrigible juvenile offender 
affords him or her a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,”  Graham, 
560 U.S. at 75, we feel it only necessary to state the obvious: a 
de facto LWOP sentence cannot possibly provide a meaningful 
                                              
safety than does that of a non-homicide offender.  However, 
Graham squarely forecloses this argument: “To justify life 
without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender 
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to 
make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.” 560 U.S. at 
72.  Under Miller, a judge can still make a determination that 
the juvenile offender is incorrigible and sentence him to 
LWOP, thereby incapacitating the offender and removing him 
or her from society.  Thus, a juvenile homicide offender who 
is not incorrigible by definition does not pose a permanent 
danger to society, making perpetual incapacitation an 
inappropriate penological justification for the sentence. 
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opportunity for release because it relegates the juvenile 
offender to spending the rest of his or her life behind prison 
bars and prohibits him or her from ever reentering society.  As 
the Graham Court stated: 
[LWOP] forswears altogether the rehabilitative 
ideal. By denying the defendant the right to 
reenter the community, the State makes an 
irrevocable judgment about that person’s value 
and place in society. This judgment is not 
appropriate in light of a juvenile . . . offender’s 
capacity for change and limited moral 
culpability.  
560 U.S. at 74.  The Court’s reasoning in Graham applies to 
de facto LWOP sentences with the same force as it does to de 
jure ones.  Like de jure LWOP, de facto LWOP is entirely 
incompatible with Graham’s mandate that those juvenile 
offenders capable of reform be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 
1194 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[De facto LWOP] is irreconcilable 
with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile nonhomicide offender 
must be provided ‘some meaningful opportunity’ to reenter 
society.” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75)); see also Miller, 
567 U.S. at 473 (“Life without parole . . . [is] at odds with a 
child’s capacity for change.”).10  
                                              
 10 As a secondary argument, the Government contends 
that geriatric release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)—
which Grant could be eligible for when he reaches 70—
satisfies Graham’s requirement of meaningful opportunity for 
release.   
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D. The Decisions of Other Circuits 
 Our holding that Miller and its antecedents prohibit 
sentencing non-incorrigible juvenile offenders to term-of-
years sentences that meet or exceed their life expectancy has 
also been adopted by a plurality of our sister circuits.  Notably, 
in McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016), Judge 
Posner applied the logic of Miller to vacate a 100-year sentence 
imposed on a non-incorrigible juvenile offender, reasoning that 
the District Court “did not consider the Supreme Court’s 
‘children are different’ statement in Miller,” and that:  
 [I]t is such a long term of years (especially given 
the unavailability of early release) as to be—
unless there is a radical increase, at present 
unforeseeable, in longevity within the next 100 
years—a de facto life sentence, and so the logic 
of Miller applies. . . .  
[T]he “children are different” passage . . . from 
Miller v. Alabama cannot logically be limited to 
de jure life sentences, as distinct from sentences 
denominated in numbers of years yet highly 
likely to result in imprisonment for life.    
                                              
 It does not. A decision under this provision is entirely 
discretionary with the Bureau of Prisons and does not assure, 
subject to judicial review, consideration of youth and attendant 
circumstances.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (“[T]he court, 
upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may 
reduce the term of imprisonment . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
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Id. at 911.   
 Similarly, in Moore, the Ninth Circuit reviewed under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, the 
California Court of Appeal’s decision that Graham did not 
apply to a 254-year sentence for multiple crimes on the basis 
that it was a term-of-years sentence.11  725 F.3d at 1187.  The 
                                              
 11 The Ninth Circuit’s review of the California Court of 
Appeal’s decision—i.e., that of an intermediate state court—
arose from litigation over Moore’s federal habeas petition:   
Moore filed pro se state habeas petitions in the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court, the 
California Court of Appeal, and the California 
Supreme Court, arguing that his sentence was 
unconstitutional under Graham. The Los 
Angeles County Superior Court summarily 
denied Moore’s petition. The California Court of 
Appeal held that Graham does not apply to 
Moore’s sentence. The California Supreme 
Court summarily denied review.   
On May 10, 2011, Moore filed a timely federal 
habeas petition.  The district court summarily 
dismissed Moore’s federal petition on the ground 
that Moore had not exhausted his available state 
remedies. . . .  
Moore timely filed a notice of appeal and applied 
for a certificate of appealability. 
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Ninth Circuit held that the state court’s failure to apply 
Graham was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law,” 
id. at 1186 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), because (1) 
“Graham’s focus was not on the label of a ‘life sentence,’” id. 
at 1192; (2) both LWOP and de facto LWOP “deny the juvenile 
the chance to return to society,” id.; and (3) the sentence “is 
irreconcilable with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender must be provided ‘some meaningful 
opportunity’ to reenter society,” id. at 1194 (quoting Graham, 
560 U.S. at 75). 
 Moreover, in Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th 
Cir. 2017), the Tenth Circuit held, also on AEDPA review, that 
a sentence of 155 years violated the Eighth Amendment under 
Graham.  Id. at 1053 n.4 (“Graham addressed any sentence 
that would deny a juvenile nonhomicide offender a realistic 
opportunity to obtain release, regardless of the label a state 
places on that sentence.”).  It reasoned that Graham created a 
categorical rule, which a state cannot escape “merely because 
[it] does not label this punishment as ‘life without parole.’”  Id. 
at 1056. 
 The Eighth Circuit is the only federal court of appeals 
to date to hold otherwise.  In United States v. Jefferson, 816 
F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2016), the Eighth Circuit determined that 
Miller did not apply to de facto life sentences because “[t]he 
Court in Miller did not hold that the Eighth Amendment 
categorically prohibits imposing a sentence of life without 
parole on a juvenile offender.”  Id. at 1018-19.  But Jefferson 
misses the point of Graham and Miller: a juvenile homicide 
offender may be sentenced to LWOP only if he or she is 
                                              
Moore, 725 F.3d at 1187.  
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determined to be incorrigible at sentencing, otherwise the State 
“must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to 
obtain release before the end of that term.”  Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 82 (emphasis added); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  That 
Miller did not categorically prohibit LWOP altogether does not 
mean that it permits de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders who are not incorrigible.  We therefore decline to 
follow Jefferson.  
 The weight of authority supports our conclusion that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for 
juvenile offenders that are not incorrigible.  Here, the District 
Court found that Grant is capable of reform, and that 
determination is not before us on appeal.  Under Miller and our 
holding today, the District Court’s finding therefore 
categorically forecloses a sentence of LWOP, whether de jure 
or de facto, and requires the District Court to sentence Grant in 
a manner that allows for “some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see also Miller, 567 
U.S. at 479.  We will therefore vacate Grant’s sentences as to 
Counts 1 and 2, and remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
V. JUVENILE SENTENCING AND MEANINGFUL 
OPPORTUNITY FOR RELEASE 
 Having held that a term-of-years sentence that meets or 
exceeds the life-expectancy of a non-incorrigible juvenile 
offender violates the Eighth Amendment, we must now 
consider the contours of the offender’s right to a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75; see also 
Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  Grant contends that his sentence does 
not afford him such an opportunity.  Relying on various 
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mortality estimates and social scientific studies, he argues that 
the District Court determined him to be capable of reform, but 
that he was nonetheless still sentenced to a term-of-years that 
allows release only when he is seventy-two, the same age as 
his estimated life expectancy.12  Even if his life expectancy 
exceeds his sentence by some years, he contends that a 
meaningful opportunity for release must afford him an 
opportunity for “[p]ersonal [f]ulfillment,” which release at age 
seventy-two does not provide.  Appellant Reply Br. at 1.   
 The Government disagrees.  It contends that seventy-
two is Grant’s life expectancy measured from birth, but that his 
life expectancy measured from his current age of forty-four is 
actually 76.7 years.  Grant’s sentence is constitutional, the 
Government argues, because he should live 4.7 years past his 
release at age seventy-two.  Thus, in the Government’s 
estimation, Grant’s sentence sufficiently provides for “hope for 
some years of life outside prison walls,” which is all that 
Graham and Miller require.  Government Br. at 29 (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 737).   
 To determine what constitutes a meaningful opportunity 
for release, we look to the Supreme Court’s original diagnosis 
of the constitutional infirmity that plagues juvenile LWOP.  
See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 857 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“We must look to the language of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion to see what it intend[s] . . . .”).  In holding that 
juvenile LWOP is not an appropriate sentence in light of an 
offender’s capacity for change and limited culpability, the 
                                              
 12 Grant’s expected age of release accounts for good 
time credit.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). 
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Court viewed the problem with the punishment as more 
profound than just denial of release:  
[A] categorical rule [barring LWOP] gives all 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to 
demonstrate maturity and reform. The juvenile 
should not be deprived of the opportunity to 
achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential. . . . 
Life in prison without the possibility of parole 
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison 
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, 
no hope. 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 79; see also id. at 69-70 (“[LWOP] 
deprives the convict of . . . hope of restoration”); id. at 73 (“A 
life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile 
offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”).  This 
passage conveys the essence of what a “meaningful 
opportunity for release” is: a non-incorrigible juvenile offender 
must be afforded an opportunity for release at a point in his or 
her life that still affords “fulfillment outside prison walls,” 
“reconciliation with society,” “hope,” and “the opportunity to 
achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human 
worth and potential.”  Id. at 79.  That is, the mandate 
encompasses more than mere physical release at a point just 
before a juvenile offender’s life is expected to end.      
 The contours of the requirement are also informed by 
the Court’s concern that “defendants serving life without 
parole sentences are often denied access to vocational training 
and other rehabilitative services that are available to other 
inmates.”  Id. at 74; see also id. at 79 (“[I]t is the policy in some 
prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation 
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programs for those who are ineligible for parole 
consideration.”).  This view illustrates the Court’s belief that—
in order to afford “hope” and a chance for “fulfillment outside 
prison walls,” “reconciliation with society,” and “self-
recognition of human worth and potential,” consistent with the 
Eighth Amendment, id. at 79—the State must give non-
incorrigible juvenile offenders the opportunity to meaningfully 
reenter society upon their release.13  See id. at 75 (“[The Eighth 
Amendment] prohibit[s] States from making the judgment at 
the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter 
society.”); see also id. at 74 (stating that it is “not appropriate” 
for sentencing courts to “deny[] the [non-incorrigible juvenile] 
defendant the right to reenter the community” in light of his or 
her “capacity for change and limited moral culpability” 
(emphasis added)).    
 We must therefore effectuate the Court’s mandate and 
adopt a broader conception of what constitutes a “meaningful 
opportunity for release” than what the Government puts forth.  
The Government’s “hope for some years outside prison walls” 
standard is too narrow in light of the Court’s statements that 
the Eighth Amendment requires mitigating the pernicious long 
term effects that LWOP has on juvenile offenders who still 
have the capacity to reform.  However, we agree with the 
Government that the Supreme Court has not gone as far as to 
say that juvenile offenders must be afforded a right to a 
                                              
 13 This same concern—lack of vocational training—
also animated the Court to adopt a categorical rule in Graham, 
rather than a case-by-case approach, in order to “avoid[] the 
perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to 
an offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.”  Graham, 
560 U.S. at 79. 
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“meaningful life” after prison—in fact, neither Miller nor 
Graham even guarantees that a juvenile offender will ever be 
released from prison during his or her lifetime.  Graham, 560 
U.S. at 75; see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.  
 With this in mind, we elect to fashion a principled legal 
framework that carries out the Supreme Court’s holdings but 
goes no further.  We do so for three reasons.  First, as always, 
we are “bound to follow the mandate of the Supreme Court as 
embodied in its opinion.”  Casey, 14 F.3d at 859.  Second, 
“juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient 
immaturity of youth” are now a constitutionally recognized 
class of defendants that are afforded a right to a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.  The 
distinction between incorrigible and non-incorrigible juvenile 
homicide offenders is undoubtedly substantive, and we must 
therefore take great precautions to ensure that courts properly 
account for this feature once they have determined that a 
juvenile offender is capable of reform.  See id. (“Miller 
announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.”).  And 
third, by providing principled guidance to lower courts on how 
to effectuate the Court’s meaningful opportunity for release 
mandate, we “ensure[] ‘careful observation of [the] allocation 
of authority’ established by the three-tier system of federal 
courts which ‘is necessary for a properly functioning 
judiciary.’”  Casey, 14 F.3d at 857 (first alteration added) 
(quoting Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506, 
1508 (11th Cir. 1987)).  Accordingly, for all of these reasons, 
we resolve to provide such guidance in order to fulfill our 
judicial responsibility to give life to the minimum 
constitutional protections that the Supreme Court has found the 
Eighth Amendment requires.  
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 To begin, a sentencing process that effectuates both our 
holding that de facto LWOP for non-incorrigible juvenile 
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment and a meaningful 
opportunity for release must start with a factual determination 
of the juvenile offender’s life expectancy.  We shall require 
sentencing courts to make this determination so that a juvenile 
offender who is capable of reform is not sentenced to a term-
of-years beyond his or her expected mortality.  Additionally, 
the juvenile offender’s life expectancy provides an informed 
estimate that allows sentencing courts to calculate the amount 
of time that he or she will have to reenter society after an 
opportunity for release.      
 How, then, does one measure life expectancy?  One 
source could be actuarial tables or life expectancy data.  In 
addition to accounting for gender, life expectancy tables can 
“focus more granularly on numerous other distinctions that 
impact the life expectancy of a particular individual, such as 
race, income, geography, education, family history, medical 
history, and other factors.”  United States v. Mathurin, 868 
F.3d 921, 932 (11th Cir. 2017).   But reliance solely on life 
expectancy tables is problematic.  In Mathurin, the Eleventh 
Circuit identified the serious constitutional issues that relying 
on such data can raise: 
[This] approach does raise some questions, 
including whether it would be constitutional to 
rely on a person’s race in determining how long 
a sentence to impose on that individual.  By 
Defendant’s reasoning, and based on the 
mortality table he cited in the district court, 
Hispanics should receive longer sentences than 
either whites or blacks solely because they 
generally live longer, and Hispanic females 
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should receive the longest sentences of all due to 
their longer average life expectancy. . . . 
Further, mortality tables shed no light on 
whether it is one’s membership in a certain racial 
or ethnic population that, as a biological matter, 
determines life expectancy or whether instead it 
is the social, economic, medical, and cultural 
factors associated with a particular ethnic 
identity that primarily determine how long an 
individual can be expected to live. 
Id. (citations omitted).  These concerns are not confined to the 
context of race, either.  By virtue of having a longer life 
expectancy based on an actuarial table, women would be 
sentenced to longer prison terms than men, the richer longer 
than the poorer, and the well-educated longer than the lesser 
educated, to name a few.  We therefore decline to advise that 
life expectancy be measured based solely on actuarial tables 
alone.  See O’Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 308, 309 (3d 
Cir. 1957) (“[L]ife tables are a guide, not a formula which a 
judge . . . is compelled to apply.”). 
 Rather, to avoid the aforementioned constitutional 
problems, we hold that a sentencing judge must conduct an 
individualized evidentiary hearing to determine the non-
incorrigible juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy 
before sentencing him or her to a term-of-years sentence that 
runs the risk of meeting or exceeding his or her mortality.  Such 
hearings are already a familiar exercise for lower courts, which 
routinely measure life expectancy in various tort, contract, and 
employment disputes.  See, e.g., Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 
838 F.2d 701, 709 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A claimant’s work and life 
expectancy are pertinent factors in calculating front pay, just 
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as they are in assessing damages for future loss of earnings in 
breach of employment contract and personal injury cases.”).  
Critically, in addition to actuarial tables, lower courts should 
consider any evidence made available by the parties that bears 
on the offender’s mortality, such as medical examinations, 
medical records, family medical history, and pertinent expert 
testimony.  Our foregoing constitutional concerns are dispelled 
by consideration of such evidence at an individualized hearing, 
which affords lower courts substantial discretion to “make an 
individualized assessment based on the facts presented,” Gall 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), so that “the 
punishment . . . fit[s] the offender and not merely the crime,” 
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487-88 (2011) (quoting 
Williams v. People of State of N.Y., 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).   
 Once a non-incorrigible juvenile offender’s life 
expectancy has been determined, the next step is for a 
sentencing court to shape a sentence that properly accounts for 
a meaningful opportunity for release.  As discussed, a 
“meaningful opportunity for release” must provide for “hope” 
and a chance for “fulfillment outside prison walls,” 
“reconciliation with society,” and “the opportunity to achieve 
maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and 
potential.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.  This mandate, therefore, 
raises a challenging question for this Court: at what age is one 
still able to meaningfully reenter society after release from 
prison?  Is there a principled reason for why, say, a juvenile 
offender can properly reenter society at age fifty but not at age 
sixty?  At age sixty but not at age seventy?  We believe not.  
Unlike in Roper, where the Supreme Court relied on scientific 
and social scientific scholarship to proscribe the death penalty 
for anyone who commits a crime before the age of eighteen, 
see 543 U.S. at 569-70, we are not aware of any widely 
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accepted studies to support such precise line drawing on a 
principled basis in the prison release context.   
 However, what is clear is that society accepts the age of 
retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual 
permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to 
society over the course of his or her working life.  See, e.g., 
Retirement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“Termination of one’s own employment or career, esp. upon 
reaching a certain age . . . .”).  It is indisputable that retirement 
is widely acknowledged as an earned inflection point in one’s 
life, marking the simultaneous end of a career that contributed 
to society in some capacity and the birth of an opportunity for 
the retiree to attend to other endeavors in life.   
 As we stated above, a non-incorrigible juvenile offender 
is not guaranteed an opportunity to live a meaningful life, and 
certainly not to a meaningful retirement.  Nevertheless, in order 
to effectuate the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of 
meaningful opportunity for release, a juvenile offender that is 
found to be capable of reform should presumptively be 
afforded an opportunity for release at some point before the age 
of retirement.  Cf. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (“To determine 
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look 
beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. 
at 102)).  A sentence that preserves the juvenile offender’s 
opportunity to contribute productively to society inherently 
provides him or her with “hope” to “reconcil[e] with society” 
and achieve “fulfillment outside prison walls.”  Id. at 79.  It 
also accounts for the Court’s trepidation that LWOP sentences 
deprive non-incorrigible juvenile offenders of vocational 
training opportunities, which presumably otherwise prepare 
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them to become productive members of society’s working 
class.  See id. at 74.   
 Accordingly, lower courts must consider the age of 
retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy 
and the § 3553(a) factors, when sentencing juvenile offenders 
that are found to be capable of reform.  Critically, under all 
circumstances, lower courts must only consider the uniform 
national age of retirement.  Otherwise, estimates of retirement 
ages that account for locality, state, gender, race, wealth or 
other differentiating characteristics raise similar constitutional 
concerns to those plagued by reliance on life-expectancy tables 
alone.  Without fixing the age of retirement to a uniform 
standard, classes of juvenile defendants that retire on average 
later in life would unreasonably be subjected to longer 
sentences.  Cf. Mathurin, 868 F.3d at 932 (sentencing juveniles 
based solely on mortality tables “would unquestionably lead to 
challenges from defendants from longer-living ethnic groups 
who would be subject to longer sentences based on that 
ethnicity”).   
 We cannot say with certainty what the precise national 
age of retirement is, as it is a figure that incrementally 
fluctuates over time.  The Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) provides for early retirement at age sixty-two and—
for people born after 1960—for full retirement at age sixty-
seven.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.409.   Over half of Americans that 
retired in 2016 did so early and before their full retirement 
age.14  A series of polls conducted by Gallup News since April 
                                              
 14 The SSA reported that 1,647,370 of the 2,910,752 
Americans who claimed Social Security retirement benefits 
had their benefits reduced for early retirement.  See SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT 2017, TABLE 
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2014 have indicated sixty-two, sixty-five, and sixty-six as 
either the mean or median ages of retirement or expected ages 
of retirement.15  Yet another study concluded that the average 
age of retirement is sixty-four for men and sixty-two for 
women.  See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH 
AT BOS. COLL., The Average Age of Retirement: An Update 
(2015).  Thus, by all accounts, the national age of retirement to 
date is between sixty-two and sixty-seven inclusive.   
 However, the age of sixty-five appears to be the 
commonly accepted age of retirement in the national 
conscience.  It was set as the original normal retirement age 
when the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935, and remains 
one of the most—if not the most—frequent ages of retirement.  
See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 210(c), 
                                              
6.B3, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION WITH AND 
WITHOUT REDUCTION FOR EARLY RETIREMENT, BY SEX 
AND MONTHLY BENEFIT, 2016 (2017). 
 15 Lydia Saad, Three in 10 U.S. Workers Foresee 
Working Past Retirement Age, Gallup News (May 13, 2016), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/191477/three-workers-foresee-
working-past-retirement-age.aspx; Rebecca Rifkin, Americans 
Settling on Older Retirement Age, Gallup News (Apr. 29, 
2015), http://news.gallup.com/poll/182939/americans-
settling-older-retirement-age.aspx; Rebecca Rifkin, Average 
U.S. Retirement Age Rises to 62, Gallup News (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/168707/average-retirement-
agerises.aspx?g_source=position5&g_medium=related%20&
g_%20 campaign=tiles. 
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49 Stat. 620 (defining “qualified individual” for Social 
Security purposes in part as “any individual with respect to 
whom . . . is at least sixty-five years of age”); id. § 202(a) 
(authorizing “qualified individual[s]” to receive Social 
Security payments “on the date [they] attain[] the age of sixty-
five”).16  Today, pension plans must begin to distribute benefits 
by age sixty-five to qualify for various significant tax benefits, 
see 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14)(A), and the Employment 
Retirement Security Act defines the term “normal retirement 
age” in part as “the time a plan participant attains age 65,” 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(24); see also 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(8)(B)(i) 
(same); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)-7(b)(ii)(A) (same).  Without 
definitively determining the issue, we consider sixty-five as an 
adequate approximation of the national age of retirement to 
date.  However, district courts retain the discretion to 
determine the national age of retirement at sentencing, and 
                                              
 16 See also Norma B. Coe et. al., Sticky Ages: Why Is 
Age 65 Still a Retirement Peak? (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. 
Coll., Working Paper No. 2013-2, 2013) (explaining why 
retirees commonly elect to retire at age sixty-five even after 
SSA increased full retirement age to sixty-six); Wojciech 
Kopczuk & Jae Song, Stylized Facts and Incentive Effects 
Related to Claiming of Retirement Benefits Based on Social 
Security Administration Data 14 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2008-200, 2008) (concluding from 
SSA administrative data that “retiring around [one’s] 65th 
birthday has intrinsic value to individuals”); id. at 13 (“It is 
clear that following the increase in the full retirement age, the 
number of retirements at the 65th birthday remains elevated 
. . . .”).   
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remain free to consider evidence of the evolving nature of this 
estimate. 
 We do not, however, categorically foreclose the 
possibility that a district judge may sentence a non-incorrigible 
juvenile offender beyond the national age of retirement, subject 
to the § 3553(a) factors.  A sentencing judge has “greater 
familiarity with . . . the individual case and the individual 
defendant before him than the . . . appeals court.”  Kimbrough 
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357-58 (2007)).  “He is therefore 
‘in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under 
§ 3553(a)’ in each particular case.”  Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. 
at 51); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 
(2005) (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to 
exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range.”).  In light of the fact that Miller did not 
categorically bar a sentencing court from imposing LWOP on 
juvenile homicide offenders to begin with, we believe that it 
would be inappropriate to restrict a district court’s discretion 
to fashion an appropriate term-of-years sentence in the 
alternative.   
 We therefore adopt only a rebuttable presumption that a 
non-incorrigible juvenile offender should be afforded an 
opportunity for release before the national age of retirement, 
not a hard and fast rule.  While we believe that this presumption 
is necessary to give life to the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Graham and Miller, it also affords lower courts the discretion 
to depart from it in the exceptional circumstances where a 
juvenile offender is found to be capable of reform but the 
§ 3553(a) factors still favor a sentence beyond the national age 
of retirement.  We believe that such instances will be rare and 
unusual, and that, even then, a term-of-years sentence cannot 
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meet or exceed the juvenile offender’s life expectancy.  
However, given the “discrete institutional strengths” of district 
courts to provide for individualized sentencing, Kimbrough, 
552 U.S. at 109, we see no reason why they should not retain 
such discretion in the juvenile context, so long as their 
departure is consistent with Miller’s Eighth Amendment 
guarantee for a meaningful opportunity for release.17  
 To summarize, we hold that: (1) a sentence that either 
meets or exceeds a non-incorrigible juvenile offender’s life 
expectancy violates the Eighth Amendment; (2) courts must 
hold evidentiary hearings to determine the non-incorrigible 
juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy before sentencing 
him or her to a term-of-years that may meet or exceed his or 
her expected mortality; and (3) when sentencing the juvenile 
homicide offender, a court must consider as sentencing factors 
his or her life expectancy and the national age of retirement, in 
addition to the § 3553(a) factors, to properly structure a 
meaningful opportunity for release.  A non-incorrigible 
juvenile offender should presumptively be sentenced below the 
national age of retirement, unless the remaining sentencing 
                                              
17 However, as with all sentences, district courts are 
required to take into account the “overarching provision” of 
§ 3553(a), which compels them to “‘impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to accomplish the 
goals of sentencing.”  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101 (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)); see also United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 
530, 552 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The ‘overarching principle’ of 
parsimony that Congress included in § 3553 directs the courts 
to impose a sentence ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
to comply with the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)].’” (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))). 
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factors strongly mitigate against doing so.  Sentencing judges 
therefore retain the discretion to sentence incorrigible juvenile 
offenders to LWOP and non-incorrigible ones to a term-of-
years beyond the national age of retirement but below life 
expectancy, although we believe that either of these 
circumstances will be rare and exceptional.18   
 Our decision today effectuates Miller and its 
antecedents—as we are required to do—which provide that 
non-incorrigible juvenile offenders must be afforded a  
meaningful opportunity for “fulfillment outside prison walls,” 
“reconciliation with society,” “hope,” and the “opportunity to 
achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human 
worth and potential.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.  We will vacate 
Grant’s sixty-year sentences for the RICO conspiracy and 
racketeering convictions, and remand to the District Court to 
resentence Grant consistent with this opinion.19 
VI. SENTENCING PACKAGE DOCTRINE 
 Separately, Grant argues that the sentencing package 
doctrine requires vacatur of his forty-year concurrent sentence 
                                              
 18 Nothing in our opinion today disturbs a district 
court’s ability to determine in the first instance that a juvenile 
is incorrigible and therefore eligible for LWOP under Miller. 
 19 Because we vacate for the aforementioned reasons, 
we need not consider Grant’s alternative contention that the 
District Court did not adequately consider his youth and 
attendant circumstances.   
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for the drug convictions and the five-year consecutive sentence 
for the gun offense.  That doctrine states:  
[W]hen a defendant is found guilty on a 
multicount indictment, there is a strong 
likelihood that the district court will craft a 
disposition in which the sentences on the various 
counts form part of an overall plan. When a 
conviction on one or more of the component 
counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the 
judge should be free to review the efficacy of 
what remains in light of the original plan, and to 
reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon 
remand . . . if that appears necessary in order to 
ensure that the punishment still fits both crime 
and criminal. 
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 180 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Davis, 112 
F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also id. at 181-82 (“When a 
conviction on one or more interdependent counts is vacated on 
appeal, the resentencing proceeding conducted on remand is de 
novo unless we specifically limit the district court’s 
authority.”).  This argument is before us on plain error review 
because defense counsel did not explicitly raise the sentencing 
package doctrine below, a point which Grant concedes.20  
                                              
 20 Grant argues that de novo review should nonetheless 
apply because defense counsel repeatedly argued below that all 
of the sentences across the multiple counts were “all part and 
parcel of one sentence [of life without parole].”  Appellant 
Reply Br. at 22 (quoting A40).  Grant relies on Brennan v. 
Norton for the proposition that the “crucial question regarding 
waiver is whether [Grant] presented the argument with 
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sufficient specificity to alert the district court.”  350 F.3d 399, 
418 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 
459, 471 (3d Cir. 1993)).   
 The sentencing package doctrine, however, has been 
applied in our precedential opinions only to vacated 
convictions—not vacated sentences—because “[w]hen a 
conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, 
common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review 
the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan . . . in 
order to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and 
criminal.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 180 (quoting Davis, 112 F.3d at 
122).  Grant’s request that the District Court resentence him de 
novo in light of his vacated sentences did not invoke the 
doctrine because the “crime and criminal” remained 
unchanged given that his underlying convictions were still 
intact.  He also did not contend to the District Court that the 
doctrine should be extended to vacated sentences.   
 Grant therefore failed to adequately raise his sentencing 
package argument before the District Court, and this issue is 
not preserved.  See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 
545, 558 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Theories not raised squarely [before 
the district court] cannot be surfaced for the first time on 
appeal.”); United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“We hold that for parties to preserve an argument for 
appeal, they must have raised the same argument in the District 
Court—merely raising an issue that encompasses the appellate 
argument is not enough.”); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 
724, 728 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[V]ague allusion[s] to an issue will 
not suffice to preserve it for appeal[.]” (first and second 
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United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We 
apply plain error review when an issue was not brought to the 
attention of the district court.”); see Appellant Reply Br. at 22 
(“[C]ounsel did not use the magic words ‘sentencing package 
doctrine’ . . . .”).  
 Grant’s sentencing package contention fails on plain 
error review.  The sentencing package doctrine provides a basis 
for a de novo resentencing when “a conviction on one or more 
interdependent counts is vacated.”  Miller, 594 F.3d at 181-82 
(emphasis added); see also Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
1170, 1176 (2017) (explaining that sentencing package cases 
“typically involve . . . a successful attack by a defendant on 
some but not all of the counts of conviction.” (quoting 
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253 (2008))).  Here, 
all of Grant’s convictions were affirmed on direct review, and 
the sentencing package doctrine, as we have previously defined 
it, is therefore inapplicable.  Whether the doctrine should also 
apply to vacated sentences raises a substantial question that 
merits further consideration.21  See United States v. Catrell, 
                                              
alterations added) (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009))). 
 21 Grant incorrectly contends that our precedent already 
dictates that the sentencing package doctrine applies to 
instances where a sentence alone is vacated.  Two of the three 
cases that he relies on—United States v. Fumo, 513 F. App’x. 
215 (3d Cir. 2013), and United States v. Brown, 385 F. App’x. 
147 (3d Cir. 2010)—are not precedential, and as such, are of 
no effect.  See Internal Operating Procedures of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 5.7 (January 
2017) (“The court by tradition does not cite to its not 
precedential opinions as authority.”).  The third case, United 
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774 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2014) (applying sentencing 
package doctrine to vacated sentence).  However, we decline 
to reach that issue today because Grant did not adequately 
preserve it, see supra note 20, and it is therefore not properly 
before us.  See United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 727 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“[A]rguments not raised in the district courts are 
waived on appeal.”).  The alleged error that Grant identifies is 
not plain, and his sentences on the drug and gun possession 
convictions remain unchanged.22    
VII. CONCLUSION 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will vacate Grant’s 
sentences as to his RICO conspiracy and racketeering 
convictions (Counts 1 and 2).  We will also vacate Grant’s 
sentence for drug conspiracy (Count 4) so that the District 
Court may correct its inadvertent sentencing error and reinstate 
the original forty-year concurrent sentence for this conviction.  
This case is remanded to the District Court to resentence Grant 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                              
States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), does not 
explicitly invoke the doctrine.  Furthermore, we adopted the 
sentencing package doctrine in 1997, ten years after 
Guevremont was decided.  See Davis, 112 F.3d at 122; see also 
Miller, 594 F.3d at 180 (“In Davis, we endorsed the 
‘sentencing package doctrine’ . . . .”). 
 22 We do, however, exempt Grant’s sentence to Count 4 
from this holding.  As discussed above, supra note 3, we will 
vacate this sentence for the sole purpose of allowing the 
District Court to correct its inadvertent sentencing error. 
1 
 
United States v. Grant, No. 16-3820, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.   
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
I join in full Parts III through V of the majority.  I 
completely agree with the majority’s approach to the 
challenging yet critical issues that this appeal raises with 
respect to the Eighth Amendment and juvenile sentencing and 
that we must vacate Grant’s sixty-year sentences as to Counts 
1 and 2.  Furthermore, the sixty-year sentence imposed on 
Count 4 constituted an inadvertent error and must be vacated.  
However, I cannot join Part VI of the majority opinion.  In 
short, Grant raised with sufficient specificity the argument 
that the sentencing package doctrine applied in this case, and 
the District Court thereby committed reversible error by 
failing to apply this doctrine.  Accordingly, I would vacate all 
of the sentences imposed by the District Court and remand for 
resentencing de novo on Counts 4, 5, 6, and 11 as well as on 
Counts 1 and 2.   
As the majority notes, the sentencing package doctrine 
generally states: 
“[W]hen a defendant is found guilty on a 
multicount indictment, there is a strong 
likelihood that the district court will craft a 
disposition in which the sentences on the 
various counts form part of an overall plan.  
When a conviction on one or more of the 
component counts is vacated, common sense 
dictates that the judge should be free to review 
the efficacy of what remains in light of the 
original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing 
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architecture upon remand . . . if that appears 
necessary in order to ensure that the punishment 
still fits both crime and criminal.   
(Maj. Op. at 43-44 (quoting United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 
172, 180 (3d Cir. 2010)).)  “When a conviction on one or 
more interdependent counts is vacated on appeal, the 
resentencing proceeding conducted on remand is de novo 
unless we specifically limit the district court’s authority.”  
Miller, 594 F.3d at 181-82.  It appears uncontested that this 
doctrine applies in the § 2255 context.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 120-24 (3d Cir. 1997).   
 While the majority relies on the plain error standard of 
review, I believe that Grant adequately preserved his 
argument regarding the applicability of the sentencing 
package doctrine.  Although (at least in retrospect) Grant 
should have explicitly referred to the doctrine, there is no 
“magic words” requirement for deciding whether a party has 
sufficiently raised a particular theory or argument.  Instead, 
“the ‘crucial question regarding waiver is whether [Grant] 
presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the 
district court.’”  (Id. at 44 n.20 (quoting Brennan v. Norton, 
350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 2003)).)  Grant clearly argued that 
the District Court was required to resentence de novo on all 
counts.  At the resentencing hearing ordered by the District 
Court, his attorney’s statements implicated the basic notion of 
a single sentencing “package” by characterizing the 
individual sentences as “part and parcel” of one overall 
sentence:   
[T]his was all part and parcel of one sentence.  I 
don’t think anybody looked upon this as 
somehow a breakdown of you got 40 on this, 
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you got 40 on that and five on that.  This was a 
life sentence” (A40); “[I]t is really part and 
parcel of the entire sentence that was imposed 
here, Judge.  [To now say] you really got this 
40, and you got this five, I mean really is not 
the spirit of Miller” (A43); “If you parcel out 
the 40 at this time, Judge, is not really 
consistent with what Judge Ackerman was 
doing.  Ackerman knew, Judge Ackerman that 
he was giving him life without parole.  So, I 
mean, to say now that, well, this part should 
stand, I mean, it is not really consistent with 
what the sentence was.  The sentence was life 
without parole.  I submit to your Honor that 
really what we are here for today is a new 
sentencing hearing” (A44); “[I]t should be clear 
that really it is a whole new sentencing.  
Everything was part and parcel of imposing a 
sentence that the Court thought was the correct 
sentence” (A85). 
I do not believe that anything more was required to raise the 
sentencing package doctrine (after all, it is Grant’s position 
that the doctrine clearly applies where a sentence is vacated 
and not merely where the underlying conviction is vacated, 
and, as I explain below, I agree with Grant).  In fact, the 
District Court told defense counsel that “I understand your 
point.”  (A42.)  “You are saying that I should look at this as 
one cohesive sentence of life and treat it that way in 
determining what is an appropriate total sentence.”  (Id.)  “So 
the 40-year sentence -- anyway, I understand your point.  You 
say it is part and parcel of all one sentence, and that the 
sentence as a whole was offensive to the Miller concept, 
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right?”  (A44.)  The District Court then expressly disposed of 
Grant’s argument that “this is an entirely new sentence” 
(A151) and essentially applied law of the case principles 
instead of the sentencing package doctrine. 
 According to the majority, “[t]he sentencing package 
doctrine . . . has been applied in our precedential opinions 
only to vacated convictions—not vacated sentences—because 
‘[w]hen a conviction on one or more of the component counts 
is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be 
free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the 
original plan . . . in order to ensure that the punishment still 
fits both crime and criminal.’”  (Maj. Op. at 44-45 n.20 
(quoting Miller, 594 F.3d at 180).)  However, I see no reason 
why the doctrine does not apply to vacated sentences.  In 
other words, what real difference is there between a vacated 
sentence and a vacated conviction for purposes of the 
sentencing package doctrine?  A vacated sentence on one or 
more counts may mean that “what remains” no longer fits the 
“criminal.”  “Because a district court’s ‘original sentencing 
intent may be undermined by altering one portion of the 
calculus, United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 832 ([7th Cir. 
2005]), an appellate court when reversing one part of a 
defendant’s sentence ‘may vacate the entire sentence . . . so 
that, on remand, the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing 
plan . . . to satisfy the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).’ Greenlaw v. United States, [554 U.S. 237, 253 
(2008)].”  Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) 
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A 
prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by 
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 
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was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or 
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence.” (emphasis added)).  In United States v. 
Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), we allowed the 
district court to correct an illegal sentence: 
In addition to allowing an increase in 
sentence when the sentence is less than the 
statutory minimum, courts have also held that, 
where the sentencing judge’s intention is clear, 
an increase of the sentence to make it conform 
with that intention is constitutional.  In United 
States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert 
denied, [452 U.S. 918] (1981), we rejected the 
argument that the Constitution does not allow 
an increase of sentence in a case where the 
sentencing judge’s intention is clear.  In Busic, 
we ruled that, where one count of an 
interdependent sentencing plan has been 
vacated on appeal, the entire plan should be 
vacated and the defendant should be 
resentenced according to the initial intent of the 
court.  We found that, under the circumstances, 
concerns of judicial vindictiveness were 
removed and to hold otherwise would allow 
“the court’s sentencing plan . . . [to be] 
thwarted.”  639 F.2d at 947.   
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 Id. at 428 (citations omitted).1  Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the Tenth Circuit “appl[ied] [the] sentencing 
package doctrine to [a] vacated sentence.”  (Id. at 46-47 
(citing United States v. Catrell, 774 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 
2014)).)  While the Catrell court acknowledged that it (like 
both the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court) has stated that 
the doctrine applies when one of the counts is set aside, 
“[t]his language is best viewed as descriptive rather than 
prescriptive.”  Catrell, 774 F.3d at 670. 
Furthermore, the specific circumstances of this case 
clearly favor the application of the sentencing package 
doctrine.  This case involves more than, to give two 
examples, mere errors in calculating the defendant’s offense 
level or range under the Sentencing Guidelines.  (See, e.g., 
Appellee’s Brief at 20-21 (“Since, then, however, at least one 
panel, citing United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735 
(3d Cir. 2013), has opined that de novo resentencing still 
would not be required, even when a conviction is vacated 
                                              
1 The majority asserts that Guevremont did not 
explicitly invoke the sentencing package doctrine and was 
decided ten years before this Court adopted the doctrine.  
However, Guevremont did, at the very least, rely on our 
language in Busic, which, in turn, “gave rise to what has since 
been termed the sentencing package doctrine,” United States 
v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 1998).  The majority 
also recognizes that the Court has applied this doctrine in the 
context of vacated sentences in two non-precedential 
decisions.  See United States v. Fumo, 513 F. App’x 215, 
218-19 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Brown, 385 F. App’x 
147, 148 (3d Cir. 2010).     
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unless the vacated count affects the defendant’s total offense 
level or guideline range.”  (citing United States v. Walpole, 
599 F. App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2015))).)  Instead, the District 
Court determined that Grant’s original LWOP sentences were 
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s recent rulings 
applying the Eighth Amendment to juvenile sentencing and 
ultimately resentenced him to serve concurrent terms of sixty 
years on these counts.  We then have considered in this 
appeal novel issues of constitutional law regarding the unique 
protections that the Eighth Amendment affords to juvenile 
offenders.  Based on our holdings, “[w]e will vacate Grant’s 
sixty-year sentences for the RICO conspiracy and 
racketeering convictions, and remand to the District Court to 
resentence Grant consistent with this opinion.”  (Maj. Op. at 
43 (footnote omitted).)  In turn, the government asserts that 
Grant’s emphasis on the interconnected nature of the 
sentences does not alter the analysis because it is undisputed 
that a defendant’s sentences, “when ‘collect[ed] . . . in the 
aggregate, [Appellant’s Brief at 51-52], constitute an entire 
package.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 22 (citing United States v. 
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc)).)  
Specifically, the five-year consecutive sentence on the gun 
conviction was clearly implicated by this constitutional 
analysis.  For instance, the majority acknowledged in its 
introduction as well as its summary of the factual and 
procedural history that “the District Court sentenced Grant to 
a term of sixty-five years without parole” (Maj. Op. at 3) and, 
“[u]nder this sentence, assuming good time credit, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), Grant will be eligible for release at age 
seventy-two, which he contends is the same age as his life 
expectancy” (id. at 8).  Both Grant and the government relied 
on this sixty-five-year term in their respective life expectancy 
arguments.  In addition, the original LWOP sentences 
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affected the sentencing decisions on the remaining counts by 
rendering such decisions merely symbolic.  Whatever 
sentence the sentencing court imposed on the drug (and gun) 
counts, it was clear that Grant would die in prison.  
Accordingly, the District Court indicated at its original 
sentencing that it “wants to send a message” about the 
“plague” of drugs.  (A450-A451.)  “On resentencing, of 
course, with the LWOP sentences on Counts 1 and 2 vacated, 
the 40 years on Counts 4-6 were highly consequential, 
establishing a substantial floor for the overall sentence.”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 52.) 
Eighth Amendment case law likewise indicates that the 
sentencing package doctrine governs this proceeding.  
“Notably, in McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 
2016), Judge Posner applied the logic of Miller to vacate a 
100-year sentence imposed on a non-incorrigible juvenile 
offender.”  (Maj. Op. at 26.)  However, this offender was 
actually sentenced to “consecutive 50-year prison terms.”  Id. 
at 909.  The majority also relies on AEDPA rulings from the 
Ninth and the Tenth Circuit concluding that the respective 
aggregate sentences violated the Eighth Amendment under 
Miller and Graham, respectively.  See Budder v. Addison, 
851 F.3d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir.) (three life sentences and 
additional sentence of twenty years all to be served 
consecutively and petitioner will not be eligible for parole 
until he served 131.75 years), cert. denied sub nom. Byrd v. 
Budder, 138 S. Ct. 475 (2017); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 
1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 2013) (consecutive sentences totaling 
254 years and four months with parole eligibility after 
petitioner served 127 years and two months).  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that “a 
trial court judge, in resentencing a juvenile offender originally 
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sentenced to multiple consecutive terms of life without the 
possibility of parole, may conduct a sentencing hearing to 
consider resentencing the juvenile offender to concurrent 
terms.”  Commonwealth v. Costa, 33 N.E.3d 412, 415 (Mass. 
2015).  Like this Court, Massachusetts recognizes the 
sentencing package doctrine.  See, e.g., id. at 417.  While the 
practical consequences of deciding between consecutive and 
concurrent sentences were originally limited to the 
defendant’s treatment in prison, the state’s intervening case 
law applying Miller “transformed a choice that could be 
regarded as ‘somewhat symbolic’ into one of some 
consequence since a consecutive sentence doubles the amount 
of time the defendant must serve before he becomes eligible 
for parole.”  Id.   
Significantly, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly 
invoked the sentencing package doctrine in reversing a “de 
facto” LWOP sentence and “remand[ing] to the district court 
with instructions to resentence on all counts.”  Bear Cloud v. 
State, 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014).  The state supreme 
court originally affirmed sentences of “20-25 years in prison 
for Aggravated Burglary, life in prison ‘according to law’ for 
first-degree murder [i.e., LWOP], to be served consecutively 
to the aggravated burglary sentence; and 20-25 years in prison 
for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, to be served 
concurrently with the first-degree murder sentence.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, ordering “‘Judgment vacated, and case remanded to 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming for further consideration in 
light of [Miller].”  Id. (quoting Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 133 
S. Ct. 183, 183-84 (2012)).  The Wyoming Supreme Court 
originally determined on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court that only the life sentence was at issue, and 
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the state trial court accordingly resentenced Bear Cloud to life 
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving 
twenty-five years, to run consecutive to the previously 
imposed sentence of twenty to twenty-five years for 
aggravated burglary and concurrently to the additional twenty 
to twenty-five sentence for conspiracy.  Id. at 136.  Bear 
Cloud appealed, and the Wyoming Supreme Court 
acknowledged that its earlier remand for resentencing solely 
on the LWOP sentence was inconsistent with Pepper as well 
as the state supreme court’s own holding in an appeal filed by 
Bear Cloud’s co-defendant, see Sen v. State, 301 P.3d 106 
(Wyo. 2013).  Bear Cloud, 334 P.3d at 141.  “When the 
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in [the 
first Bear Cloud disposition], it wiped the slate clean.  We 
remand for the district court to consider the entire sentencing 
package—that is, the sentences for all three counts—when it 
resentences Mr. Bear Cloud.”  Id. at 142; see also, e.g., id. at 
141 (“That process must be applied to the entire sentencing 
package, when the sentence is life without parole, or when 
aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of life 
without parole.”); Sen, 301 P.3d at 127 (“Further, because 
Sen’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole may 
have impacted the sentencing decisions with respect to his 
conspiracy and aggravated burglary convictions, which 
resulted in an additional 40 to 50 years imprisonment beyond 
his life term, we think the appropriate course is to vacate 
those sentences and remand for resentencing on all counts in 
order to give full effect to our decision.”).      
The District Court, however, did not “consider the 
entire sentencing package” when it resentenced Grant.  As the 
government acknowledges, the doctrine “leaves a judge ‘free 
to review,’ ‘entitled to reconsider’ and with jurisdiction to 
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recalculate’ [the] § 2255 petitioner’s entire sentence.”  
(Appellee’s Brief at 21 (quoting Davis, 112 F.3d at 122-23).)  
However, the District Court instead considered and applied 
the law of the case doctrine, explaining that “it would be 
almost unfair to the system and unfair to Judge Ackerman all 
of these years later for me to sort of sit in his shoes to figure 
out, with him having the feel of the case, having listened to 
the evidence of the distribution of the drugs, the extent of the 
drugs, the nature of the drug trafficking and enterprise that 
was involved here” and that there was nothing in the record 
indicating “that this was some kind of clear manifest injustice 
by Judge Ackerman” with respect to the drug and gun counts.  
(A152.)  Accordingly, I would vacate the sentences on the 
drug and gun counts (as well as the RICO conspiracy and 
racketeering counts) and remand for resentencing de novo.   
 
